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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in failing to dismiss 
two felony charges when defendant had already been tried and 
convicted in the Circuit Court of a misdemeanor arising from a 
single criminal episode where defendant objected to joinder when 
the State moved for joinder of the offenses in the District Court 
prior to trial in either court? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaint i f f -Respondent , ! 
- V - ! 
NORMAN HAGA, : 
Defendant-Appellant. ! 
E Case No. 20849 
s Pr ior i ty No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Norman Hagaf was charged with burglary, a 
third-degree fe lony , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1978); t h e f t , a third degree fe lony , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978); and attempted burglary, a Class A 
misdemeanor, in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978) . 
Count I I I , attempted burglary was severed from the 
other two counts and t r i e d in the c i r c u i t court. Defendant was 
convicted of attempted burglary, in a jury t r i a l held June 24, 
1985, in the Fifth Judic ia l Circuit Court, in and for Sa l t Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael Hutchings, 
pres id ing . 
Defendant was convicted of Counts I and I I , burglary, a 
f i r s t - d e g r e e fe lony , and t h e f t , a Class B misdemeanor, in a non-
jury t r i a l on July 3 1 , 1985 in the Third Judic ia l D i s t r i c t Court, 
in and for Sa l t Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Scot t 
Danie ls , pres id ing . Judge Daniels sentenced defendant on July 
3 1 , 1985 to serve terms of 0-5 years for burglary and 6 months 
for the f t at the Utah Sta te Prison, both terms t o run 
concurrently. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged in a s i n g l e information with 
third-degree felony burglary of Progressive Motors on April 1, 
1985; th ird-degree fe lony the f t at the same time and l o c a t i o n ; 
and Class A misdemeanor attempted the f t of Dan's Used Cars on the 
same date (R. 7 - 8 , 4 1 ) . After a preliminary hearing on April 
18 , 1985 on a l l three charges, the magistrate bound defendant 
over to the d i s t r i c t court on Counts I and II and severed Count 
I I I for t r i a l in the c i r c u i t court without a r t i c u l a t i n g a reason 
for severance in the record (R. 4 , 5 - 6 , 4 1 ) . Defendant was 
immediately arraigned in c i r c u i t court on Count III (R. 6) and 
was arraigned on June 7 , 1985 in d i s t r i c t court on Counts I and 
I I . 
On June 20 , 1985, defendant moved t o dismiss Counts I 
and II in the d i s t r i c t court due t o lack of a speedy t r i a l 
arguing, in ter a l i a , that i t was error for the c i r c u i t court to 
sever Count III (R. 42 , 51 -53) . At the time t h i s motion was 
argued, t r i a l s were s e t in both the d i s t r i c t and c i r c u i t courts 
for June 24 , 1985 (R. 4 , 10 , 6 7 ) . The State moved t o j o i n a l l 
counts for t r i a l in the d i s t r i c t court a f ter the court denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 42 , 6 5 ) . Defendant, however 
objected t o joinder on the grounds that he did not have proper 
not ice of the motion for joinder and did not know the reason for 
severance (R. 4 2 , 6 5 - 6 6 ) . The d i s t r i c t court denied the motion 
for jo inder (R. 4 2 , 6 7 ) . 
On June 24 , 1985, the morning of the t r i a l , defendant 
argued t o the c i r c u i t court that Count I I I was improperly severed 
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from Counts I and II while arguing a motion t o dismiss on other 
grounds (R. 110-19)• Judge Hutchings indicated that the State 
could e i ther move to jo in the cases in d i s t r i c t court or proceed 
t o t r i a l (R. 122) . Because the S t a t e ' s wi tnesses were present 
and ready t o proceed t o t r i a l and because defense counsel had 
objected t o joinder of the cases j u s t four days e a r l i e r , the 
State e l ec t ed t o proceed t o t r i a l on the misdemeanor in c i r c u i t 
court (R. 122) . Defendant was found g u i l t y of the misdemeanor 
attempted burglary charge (R. 4 2 ) . 
Trial in the d i s t r i c t court on the other two charges 
was continued at defendant's request from June 24 to July 3 1 , 
1985 (R. 1 2 ) . On July 26 f 1985, defendant returned to the 
d i s t r i c t court and moved t o dismiss the two felony charges on the 
bas i s that t r i a l on the misdemeanor precluded t r i a l on the 
f e l o n i e s a r i s i n g from a s i n g l e criminal episode under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402 (1978) (R. 12 , 70 -76) . 
Judge Daniels denied the motion t o dismiss (R. 58 ) • He 
found that the State had properly moved t o j o i n the of fenses 
prior to t r i a l and that the court 1 s bas i s for denying joinder was 
defendant's object ion (R. 43 ) . He s tated that the court ' s order 
that the cases remain severed was entered t o promote j u s t i c e 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (2) and, therefore , h is denial of 
the motion t o j o i n was proper (R. 4 3 ) . 
Defendant was subsequently convicted of third-degree 
felony burglary of Progressive Motors and Class B misdemeanor 
the f t from Progressive Motors. He appeals these convic t ions 
based on f a i l u r e to jo in of fenses that were part of a s i n g l e 
criminal episode . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The t r i a l court did not err when i t denied defendants 
motion t o dismiss felony charges that had been severed from a 
misdemeanor charge by the c i r c u i t court even i f they were part of 
a s i n g l e criminal episode. Defendant objected when the State 
moved for severance in the d i s t r i c t court and should not be 
allowed t o claim that the same court erred when i t denied h i s 
motion to dismiss the subsequent prosecut ion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO DISMISS 
FELONY CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT EVEN THOUGH 
HE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN TRIED ON A MISDEMEANOR 
CHARGE ARISING FROM A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
When the State charged defendant i n i t i a l l y , a l l three 
counts against him were joined in a s i n g l e information. After 
preliminary hearing, the magistrate severed a misdemeanor 
attempted burglary from the two felony charges, without 
explanation of reasoning in the record. Neither the State nor 
defendant challenged the severance unt i l defendant f i l e d h i s 
motion to dismiss on speedy t r i a l grounds. At that time, both 
p a r t i e s agreed that the misdemeanor charge was improperly 
severed. Defendant, however, objected t o the S t a t e ' s motion for 
rejoinder of the case s , claiming that he did not know the reason 
for severance and a lack of formal not ice of the motion as h i s 
b a s i s . Based upon defendant's ob jec t ion , Judge Daniels denied 
the S t a t e ' s motion for jo inder . On appeal, defendant argues that 
the t r i a l court erred in denying h i s motion t o dismiss the felony 
charges when they came up for t r i a l af ter he had already been 
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t r i e d and convicted of the misdemeanor charge which was part of a 
s i n g l e criminal episode . He urges that dismissal was mandatory 
under Utah Code Ann, S 76-1-403 (1978) . On the contrary, 
however, d ismissal was not required under the f a c t s of t h i s case 
when reviewed in conjunction with a l l of the relevant s t a t u t e s . 
As defendant points out , neither party contested that 
the three charges were part of a s i n g l e criminal episode. The 
only i s s u e i s whether the t r i a l court was mandated to grant h i s 
motion t o dismiss the felony charges once he had been convicted 
of the misdemeanor in a separate t r i a l . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 provides that a subsequent 
prosecution for an offense ar i s ing from a s ing l e criminal episode 
i s barred i f that offense "should have been t r i e d under sec t ion 
76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution" i f the f i r s t t r i a l 
resul ted in convic t ion . This case turns on t h i s Court's 
in terpre ta t ion of the words "should have been tr ied" in t h i s 
context . 
Defendant urges that the offenses were part of a s i n g l e 
criminal episode and, therefore , they "should have been tr ied" 
together . Defendant asks the Court to look at only one factor in 
the joinder/severance dec i s ion and ignores a l l other aspects of 
the d e c i s i o n . R e a l i s t i c a l l y , and by s t a t u t e , there are more 
factors to be considered than whether the of fenses were part of a 
s i n g l e criminal episode. 
F i r s t , Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402(2) (1978) provides: 
(2) Whenever conduct may e s t a b l i s h separate 
o f fenses under a s i n g l e criminal episode, unless 
the court otherwise orders to promote j u s t i c e , a 
defendant s h a l l not be subject t o separate t r i a l s 
for mult iple o f fenses when: 
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(a) The offenses are within the j u r i s d i c t i o n 
of a s ingle court , and 
(b) The offenses are known t o the prosecut-
ing at torney a t the time the defendant i s a r -
raigned on the f i r s t information or indictment. 
In th is case, in order to promote j u s t i c e , Judge Daniels denied 
the S t a t e ' s motion for joinder in the d i s t r i c t court a f te r 
defendant objected to jo inder . Apparently, in order to promote 
j u s t i c e , the magistrate had previously ordered severance and 
nei ther party had objected to the decis ion. All defendant 
a l l eges i s t h a t once severance was granted, for whatever reason, 
a subsequent prosecution of the two felony charges was barred by 
§ 76-1-403 because they were par t of a s ingle criminal episode. 
He a s s e r t s tha t t h i s i s so because the offenses should not have 
been severed but should have been t r i e d toge ther . Reading §§ 76-
1-402(2) and 76-1-403 together , points out tha t these offenses 
should not have been t r i e d together because severance was granted 
to promote j u s t i c e . 
Secondly, Rule 9 (§ 77-35-9) of the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure s t a t e s , in par t t h a t : 
A felony offense and a misdemeanor offense may 
be charged in the same indictment or informa-
t ion i f : 
(1) They a r i se out of a criminal episode; 
and 
(2) The defendant i s afforded a preliminary 
hearing with respect t o the misdemeanor along 
with the felony offense. • . • 
(c) The court may order two or more i n d i c t -
ments or informations or both to be t r i e d 
together if the offenses, and the defendants, if 
there i s more than one, could have been joined 
in a s ingle indictment or information. The 
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procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution 
were under such single indictment or information. 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 
or defendants in an indictment or information, or 
by a joinder for trial together, the court shall 
order an election of separate trials of separate 
counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or 
provide such other relief as justice requires. 
(emphasis added). Rule 9 does not mandate that felonies and 
misdemeanors that are part of a single criminal episode be tried 
together but states that they may be joined for trial. The use 
of the word "may" indicates that the court involved in the 
joinder decision may use its discretion based on various factors 
whether either party would be prejudiced by joinder. If the 
court may use its discretion in deciding whether to join cases 
(See, State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985)) then it is 
inconceivable that a court is thereafter required to dismiss 
counts that are tried subsequently under the guise of § 76-1-403. 
This, Court in State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), 
held that where jurisdiction over a misdemeanor laid first in the 
circuit courts, and felonies could not be tried there, subsequent 
trial of felonies which were part of a single criminal episode 
was not barred by § 76-1-402(2). In this case, the misdemeanor 
charge was properly triable in circuit court, the felonies were 
not. Where two judges, one in circuit and one in district court, 
determined that the counts were properly severed and trial on the 
misdemeanor was properly set in the circuit court, defendant 
cannot be heard to complain that the felonies were tried in a 
subsequent action in the proper court. This is especially true 
where defendant objected to joinder when it was timely requested 
by the State. 
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F i n a l l y , defendant was not precluded from f i l i n g a 
motion for joinder of the o f fenses himself . He chose, ins tead , 
to oppose the S t a t e 1 s motion for joinder and then t o attempt t o 
thwart j u s t i c e by moving to dismiss the remaining charges after 
t r i a l on the misdemeanor charge. One of the purposes behind the 
joinder r u l e , i s , after a l l , to protect a defendant from the 
p o s s i b l e misuse of mult ip le t r i a l s and t o save him unnecessary 
expense, c . f . State v. Hol t , 673 P.2d 627, 629 (Wash. App. 
1983) . With t h i s in mind, t h i s Court should consider defendant's 
oppos i t ion to joinder after the State properly moved for joinder 
as a waiver of h i s r i g h t s under § 76 -1 -403 . See a l s o . State v . 
Boyd, 271 Or. 558, 533 P.2d 795 (1975) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the S ta te requests t h i s Court 
to affirm the t r i a l court ' s denial of defendant's motion t o 
dismiss and t o affirm h i s conv ic t ion . 
DATED t h i s 7// day of August, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
{,'' SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
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